The Political Economy of Celebrity Rights by Bartholomew, Mark
University at Buffalo School of Law 
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law 
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 
Spring 1-1-2018 
The Political Economy of Celebrity Rights 
Mark Bartholomew 
University at Buffalo School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Privacy Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mark Bartholomew, The Political Economy of Celebrity Rights, 38 Whittier L. Rev. 1 (2018). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles/913 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University 
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of 
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
CELEBRITY RIGHTS
MARK BARTHOLOMEW*
If you ask legal academics, nobody cares much for the right of
publicity. The right entitles those with commercially valuable
personalities to block unauthorized use of their personas. If someone
uses Kim Kardashian's name without her agreement to help sell a
product, Ms. Kardashian can use her right of publicity to halt such use
and to seek damages. Moreover, unlike a trademark infringement claim
for unauthorized use of a business's trademark, the right of publicity
does not require onlookers to be confused by the defendant's use.
Instead, merely employing some aspect of a celebrity persona without
permission and in a commercial fashion is enough to trigger liability
under the right of publicity.
The legal academy does not like this. The general sentiment seems
to be that the right of publicity is unnecessary. Some suggest that the
articulated rationales for the right- incentivizing the creation of
captivating celebrity personas and rewarding the productive labor of
creative individuals-do not really hold water. Others argue that
consumer confusion is the only significant harm from unauthorized use
of celebrity personas and trademark law already does an adequate job of
policing such behavior. As a result, the right of publicity has been
described as "a right in search of a coherent rationale."1
* Professor of Law, University at Buffalo School of Law. Some of the ideas in this
Article are based, in part, on a larger discussion of celebrity rights that can be found in
my article, A Right is Born: Celebrity, Property, and Postmodern Lawmaking, 44 CONN.
L. R~v. 301 (2011).
1. Ellen S. Bass, Comment, A Right in Search of a Coherent Rationale-
Conceptualizing Persona in a Comparative Context: The United States Right of Publicity
and German Personality Rights, 42 U.S.F. L. REv. 799, 799 (2008). For some of the
other scholarly criticisms of the right of publicity, see Michael Madow, Private
Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REv.
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Yet despite the legal academy's misgivings, the right has grown to
be more and more expansive over time. First recognized in a decision by
the Second Circuit in 1953, the right of publicity has become a potent
tool in the arsenal of the famous and their agents. The right is a creature
of state law. Most states considering the issue have elected to recognize
the right, whether through statutory enactment or common law rulings.
Originally limited to two specific aspects of the celebrity persona-
name and likeness-the right now includes any potentially valuable
reference to a celebrity. The right also extends long after the celebrity's
passing, in some states for more than a century after death. In short, for
those imbued with celebrity status, the right represents an effective
means for controlling outside uses of one's persona, subject to little
balance with other competing concerns.
This Article discusses how the right of publicity became such a
robust property right-much more far-reaching than analogous rights in
copyright or trademark. Part I explains why intellectual property
scholars disfavor the right and why, therefore, one cannot explain the
accretion of celebrity publicity rights as a matter of legal logic. It also
partially debunks a competing narrative of the right's history. According
to this narrative, in the 1950s, lawmakers first recognized the economic
value of celebrity and immediately took steps to fully safeguard that
value via the creation of a new intellectual property right. However, there
are some problems with this "if value, then right" theory. Even after the
right of publicity was first articulated in the 1950s, something held
lawmakers back. Rather than championing full property rights in
celebrity personas, courts and legislatures made sure that the right of
publicity was not descendible and limited the aspects of persona it
protected. It was obvious to these lawmakers that celebrities could attract
consumers and that businesses were willing to pay them handsomely for
doing so. Nevertheless, it was not until the 1980s and 1990s that
lawmakers were willing to alter the terms of celebrity status, turning a
limited legal privilege into a far-reaching economic entitlement. Hence,
the history of the right of publicity cannot be described simply as a
reaction to the growing economic value of celebrity endorsements.
Part II offers one alternative explanation for the right's expansion,
outlining the political economy of modern celebrity from the perspective
125, 127 (1993); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Money as a Thumb on the Constitutional
Scale: Weighing Speech Against Publicity Rights, 50 B.C. L. REv. 1503 (2009).
Vol. 38:2
2018 THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CELEBRITY RIGHTS 3
of state lawmakers. Critical innovations to the right of publicity occurred
in the particular political environment of the 1980s and 1990s, not the
1950s. I discuss the lawmaking configurations that produced new
statutory definitions of the right of publicity during this period. Different
political actors battled for the votes of state legislators on the issue of
expanded celebrity rights. Despite some groups' resistance to new,
specialized entitlements for celebrities, the conditions were right for a
particular coalition of interest groups to push through new vigorous
interpretations of the right of publicity.
In Parts III and IV, I discuss the right's expansion from the
perspective of a different political actor: judges. At the end of the
twentieth century, the political optics of celebrity changed in a way that
provided more comfort for judges who were once hostile to the anti-
democratic implications of publicity rights. Judges had to evaluate
statutory celebrity protections as well as create their own common law
definitions of publicity rights. In this process, they confronted a
changing social definition of celebrity that was no longer linked to merit
or inner greatness. Anyone, it was now argued, had the potential to
become famous. This change in the meaning of fame made celebrity
legal protections seem less like a perk for a rarified few and more like a
fundamental right available to all.
I. EXPLANATIONS FOR THE GROWTH IN CELEBRITY RIGHTS
Before discussing the political and social factors that I believe help
explain the development of the right of publicity, I want to address two
explanations that do not adequately account for its full expansion.
A. THEORETICAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
In their public statements, judges and legislators contend that the
right of publicity simply represents a rational tool of intellectual property
protection, just like patents, copyrights, or trademarks. Few would
maintain that these other types of intellectual property serve no purpose.
Patent and copyright protection are meant to encourage the creation of
public goods that otherwise might be in short supply. Trademark law
stops unauthorized uses of particular source identifiers (words, symbols,
designs, etc.) that can confuse consumers. Along similar lines, one might
argue that lawmakers quite rationally adopted publicity rights
protections, not because of self-interest or outside influences, but
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because such protection made logical sense.
The problem with such an argument is that the rationales typically
advanced for the right of publicity do not make much sense. Perhaps the
most common argument for publicity rights is the need to encourage the
development of captivating celebrity personas. Without the right of
publicity, it is contended, we would face a world without Angelina Jolie,
LeBron James, and Taylor Swift. Outsiders could commercially use their
names and countenances without permission, thereby depriving them of
the full benefit of their celebrity efforts and discouraging their attempts
to achieve stardom. As one federal court of appeals explained in 1986,
"The reason that state law protects individual pecuniary interests
[through the right of publicity] is to provide an incentive to performers
to invest the time and resources required to develop such
performances ."2
The incentives story of the right of publicity is unconvincing. It is
hard to believe that Ms. Jolie, Mr. James, and Ms. Swift never would
have gotten into the entertainment business if they had been told that
others might make use of their celebrity without their approval. Even
without enjoying the remunerative potential of commercial
endorsements, celebrities can still receive generous payouts in other
forms, including performance fees. Moreover, in a world with no right
of publicity, stars could still license the use of their names and likenesses
for commercial purposes. It is true that without the right, they could not
guarantee a retailer the exclusive use of their names or likenesses, but it
is highly likely that many businesses would pay handsomely for the
privilege of telling consumers that they were the sole retailer authorized
to sell goods under the name of a particular celebrity. After all, a
significant market for celebrity endorsements existed before the right of
publicity's creation. 3
Perhaps most importantly, non-celebrities are often driven to
become celebrities for non-monetary reasons. Many seek attention out
of a desire to impress others or leave a monument to posterity. Others
are born with all of the tools in place for celebrity and do not need legal
incentives. For example, it was serendipity more than anything else that
2. Balt. Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 678
(7th Cir. 1986).
3. TIM Wu, THE ATTENTION MERCHANTS: THE EPIC SCRAMBLE TO GET INSIDE OUR
HEADS 225 (2016).
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brought Jim Thorpe's prodigious athletic talents to the attention of
football coach Pop Warner. A modeling scout spotted a then-unknown
Channing Tatum on a Miami street, a story that mirrors Lana Turner's
discovery in a Hollywood soda fountain. Given these alternative
motivations and pathways to fame, it seems unlikely that publicity rights
are a main impetus for the development of entertaining personas.
Moreover, despite the language of incentives often used in modern
interpretations of the right of publicity, the early cases and commentaries
concerning the right did not mention incentives. In addition to the
reasons mentioned above, there was another reason for this omission,
specific to the historical circumstances of the time. The particular
structure of the entertainment industry in the first half of the twentieth
century made it hard to believe that an award of publicity rights would
incentivize the creation of new captivating personalities. It was the
studios that controlled celebrity personas, not the celebrities themselves.
Stars operated within a regime that placed economic and creative control
in the hands of non-celebrities. "[F]ilm performers were essentially
studio-owned-and-operated commodities." 4 The studios exercised tight
legal and creative control over their stars, both on and off screen. Some
contracts even prohibited celebrities from laughing in public.5 The
studios also routinely entered into deals to use the star's image in
merchandising without the star's approval. 6 Although the studio
system's heyday was over by the end of the 1940s, when the right was
created in the early 1950s, the industry had not yet fully moved to the
4. JOSHUA GAMSON, CLAIMS TO FAME: CELEBRITY IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 25
(1994); see also DREw PINSKY & MARK YOUNG, THE MIRROR EFFECT: How CELEBRITY
NARCISSISM IS SEDUCING AMERICA 33 (2009) ("Stars were little more than well-paid
employees who could be rented or sold to other studios for profit.").
5. GAMSON, supra note 4, at 25 (noting that "Buster Keaton's contract . . .
[prohibited] him from laughing in public.").
6. K.L. Lum et al., Signed, Sealed and Delivered: "Big Tobacco" in Hollywood,
1927-1951, 17 TOBACCO CONTROL 313, 318 (2008) (describing studio control over
celebrity cigarette testimonials); Kembrew McLeod, The Private Ownership of People,
in THE CELEBRITY CULTURE READER 649,653 (P. David Marshall ed., 2006) ("Contracts
enabled movie studios to use a star's name, voice and likeness to promote the film, and
more underhandedly, it allowed for the use of a star's image to be licensed for product
endorsements, even in the most questionable and tangential circumstances."); see KERRY
SEGRAVE, ENDORSEMENTS IN ADVERTISING: A SOCIAL HISTORY 22, 23 (2005) ("Some
contracts included a clause stating that the stars would not sign any testimonials except
through the film studio's manager or publicity director. On the other hand, the studio
could sign for the star.").
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modern model of placing greater artistic and financial control in the
hands of individual artists. Given the history of studio control over
performers, publicity rights could be seen as inuring to the benefit of the
movie studios, not the individual celebrity, making it hard to explain the
right of publicity's creation in the 1950s through the incentives model.
B. IF VALUE, THEN RIGHT
Another way to explain the right of publicity's rise is not as a fully
justified intellectual property creation but as a response to the increasing
economic value of celebrity. This argument acknowledges that although
the right is not necessary to encourage or reward celebrity seeking,
lawmakers responded to the value of commercial endorsements in the
1950s by creating a new legal entitlement to protect that value. In other
words, once the value of celebrity became apparent, the legal system
stepped in.
The problem with this explanation is timing. Celebrities served as
commercial spokespersons long before the right was introduced in 1953,
and courts were aware of the financial advantages of celebrity
throughout the twentieth century. It was no secret that advertisers were
willing to pay handsomely to use celebrity names and pictures to
stimulate demand for their merchandise. An early case involved Thomas
Edison suing for the unauthorized use of his name and likeness on a type
of pain relief medicine. In evaluating Edison's claim, the court explained
that one's name and "the peculiar cast of one's features" may have a
"pecuniary value" that belongs to a single individual. 7 If the right of
publicity was simply a response to celebrity value, it seems like the right
should have been created years before.
In addition, after recognizing the right of publicity in the 1950s and
1960s, state courts and legislators held back, imposing significant
limitations on the right that dramatically limited its power. Chief among
these limitations were refusing to grant posthumous publicity rights and
narrowly defining the scope of the right to appropriations of name and
likeness. The prohibition on posthumous rights represented an important
check on the right of publicity. Strictly as a matter of timing, it meant
that celebrity could only be monetized during a famous person's
lifetime. The limited time frame diminished celebrities' worth as
7. Edison v. Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 67 A. 392, 392, 394 (N.J. Ch. 1907).
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merchandisers, and licensees could never be sure when their exclusive
rights would expire, i.e., when a particular celebrity would die.
Similarly, by restricting the right to use of a celebrity's name or picture,
lawmakers permitted a host of other unauthorized uses and thereby
reduced the right's effectiveness. These limits, which I will discuss in
more detail in Part II, were only dispensed within the 1980s and 1990s.
They suggest a discomfort with celebrity rights on the part of lawmakers
and indicate that there is more to the story of the right of publicity than
a desire to immediately protect celebrity value.
II. LEGISLATING PUBLICITY RIGHTS
States adopted a variety of new, stronger publicity rights measures
in the 1980s and 1990s. In a short period of time, the right of publicity
morphed from a limited personal right protecting a living celebrity's
name and likeness into an expansive descendible property right
extending to all aspects of persona. In the past, the right had always died
with the celebrity, but in the 1980s, several states passed new laws
extending the right of publicity to fifty, seventy-five, even one hundred
years after the death of the famous individual. Some states even made
their new publicity rights statutes retroactive, providing postmortem
protections for celebrities that had passed away decades before these
statutes were passed. Simultaneously, courts decided to recognize
common law posthumous publicity rights.
At the same time, legislators and judges took a more expansive
view of the features protectable under the right of publicity, eventually
deciding to protect anything used by another that might "identify" the
celebrity. Voice, like name and likeness, became part of the celebrity
property right, even if the secondary use at issue was only a close
imitation. 8 Courts held that using actors bearing a striking resemblance
to a celebrity in commercial activities violated the right of publicity.9
8. For example, the Ninth Circuit held that Ford potentially violated singer Bette
Midler's right of publicity by airing a car commercial featuring a cover of one of Midler's
famous songs, sung by another singer who was specifically told to imitate Midler's voice
and style. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463 (9th Cir. 1988).
9. E.g., Prudhomme v. Procter & Gamble Co., 800 F. Supp. 390, 395 96 (E.D. La.
1992) (celebrity chef's right of publicity allegation survived a motion to dismiss); Allen
v. Men's World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (Woody Allen's
right of publicity claim under a New York privacy statute survived a motion to dismiss);
Allen v. Nat'l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 621, 623, 632 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding
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Courts also came to recognize claims based on uses of objects associated
with a famous person, the best example being game show hostess Vanna
White's successful suit against Samsung Electronics for its
advertisement featuring a robot dressed in a blonde wig, gown, and
jewelry standing next to a letter board resembling the one used on Wheel
of Fortune. 10
Given the weak theoretical basis for the right of publicity, it is hard
to argue that this flurry of legislative and judicial activity represented a
strictly rational lawmaking impulse. Nor is it correct to describe this
activity as an immediate response by lawmakers to a newfound value in
celebrity endorsements. Lawmakers knew about celebrity's economic
value decades before the right's creation and nearly a century before the
right became descendible. Hence, acknowledgement of celebrity's
financial worth does not explain the right's dramatic expansion in the
century's last two decades.
Instead, one way to explain this legal shift is to look at the
particular forces that mobilized for and against publicity rights
legislation. In this period, a particular political coalition formed for
broadened publicity rights, chiefly comprised of celebrities, their heirs,
and the licensing companies that stood to gain the most from an
expanded right of publicity. Lined up against them were various
stakeholders that had their own interest in exploiting celebrity personas
without restriction. Somewhere in the middle were the media companies,
which had cause to both favor and oppose expansion of the right of
publicity. Left out of the equation were individual consumers of
celebrity. The consuming public had reasons to protest the expansion of
celebrity protections but lacked a voice in the legislative process.
A. CELEBRITIES AND THEIR LICENSING AGENTS
Understandably, two natural proponents of broader publicity rights
are celebrities and their heirs. Celebrities lobbied state legislators for
enhanced protections, and the historical record suggests that their efforts
had some effect. It was no accident that the states passing particularly
strong right of publicity laws in the 1980s and 1990s also served as the
domiciles for entertainers with obvious postmortem commercial value.
that Woody Allen was "entitl[ed] ... to relief under New York's privacy statute.").
10. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992).
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The laws enacted in Indiana, Tennessee, and Washington benefitted the
estates of James Dean, Elvis Presley, and Jimi Hendrix. Texas's
postmortem statute was dubbed the "Buddy Holly Bill" because of the
testimony of Buddy Holly's widow on behalf of the legislation. In
California, the heirs of John Wayne, Groucho Marx, and Marilyn
Monroe were all involved in various legislative enhancements of that
state's right of publicity. In an analysis of the 1985 law that first enacted
protections for deceased personalities' publicity rights, the California
Senate Judiciary Committee contended that testimony "from the son of
W.C. Fields, Priscilla Presley, and Burt Lancaster apparently convinced
the [Senate Judiciary] committee and the Legislature that increasing
protections for those rights ... were called for."11 A 1999 revision of
that law, which further strengthened publicity rights in California, was
deemed the Astaire Celebrity Image Protection Act because it was
championed by Robyn Astaire, Fred Astaire's widow. Also in
California, the Screen Actors Guild, a union representing celebrities and
celebrity hopefuls, was critical in persuading the legislature to enact the
1985 postmortem statute as well as another law in 2007 that vested the
right retroactively for celebrities who had already died before the 1985
law took effect.
Even more critical to shepherding celebrity rights legislation
through statehouses were the efforts of celebrity licensing firms. In the
1980s, firms that specialized in the licensing of celebrity personas began
to appear. The most important of these was CMG Worldwide, which
represented the commercial interests of the estates of deceased
celebrities such as Babe Ruth, Jackie Robinson, and Humphrey Bogart,
as well as living clients like Lauren Bacall and Sophia Loren. Another
firm, the Roger Richman Agency, represented the heirs of Albert
Einstein, Sigmund Freud, Clark Gable, and Mae West. Firms like CMG
and the Richman Agency lobbied for postmortem protections that could
provide a potential revenue stream that was large enough and stable
enough to trigger serious investment and rights management.
12
11. Deceased Personalities: Transfer of Publicity Rights By Testamentary
Instrument: Hearing on SB 771 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 2007 08 Reg. Sess. 1,7
(Cal. 2007) (statement of Sen. Sheila James Kuehl, Member, S. Judiciary Comm.).
12. See Kathy Heller, Deciding Who Cashes in on the Deceased Celebrity Business,
11 CHAP. L. REv. 545,545 (2008) (describing the licensing of postmortem rights as "one
of the most valuable sources of income for a celebrity's estate."); Timothy P. Terrell &
Jane S. Smith, Publicity, Liberty, and Intellectual Property: A Conceptual and Economic
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Licensing firms benefit from longer-lasting rights and legal mechanisms
for shutting down unlicensed competitors, making them natural
supporters of enhanced publicity rights. These firms were particularly
supportive of postmortem rights. Companies would be willing to pay
more for exclusive celebrity licenses if they knew that their licenses
would continue in their exclusivity past the death of the celebrity
individual. Postmortem rights lent greater predictability to celebrity
licensing, which put more money in the pockets of both the celebrities
themselves and the licensing firms.
These licensing firms were critical in pushing forward the
expansion of celebrity rights in the 1980s and 1990s. Indiana's right of
publicity statute, passed in 1994 and described as the most expansive
publicity right in the nation, was drafted by the head of CMG
Worldwide, which is based in Indianapolis. When CMG received an
adverse decision from a federal court regarding Marilyn Monroe's
estate, it quickly turned to lobbyists to push a corrective bill through the
California legislature. A few weeks later, the legislature passed a law
abrogating the decision and benefitting CMG. 13 By the end of the 1990s,
licensing firms were reaping millions of dollars in licensing fees from
deceased celebrities, thanks in part to the newfound willingness of courts
and state legislatures to recognize postmortem publicity rights.
14
B. RIVAL COPYRIGHT INTERESTS
While licensing firms are strong advocates for expanding publicity
rights, a number of other groups resist any attempts at expansion. One
interest group opposing the right of publicity is comprised of those who
hold intellectual property rights that potentially conflict with celebrity
rights. For example, photographers enjoy copyright protection for their
Analysis of the Inheritability Issue, 34 EMORY L.J. 1, 22 (1985); Eriq Gardner, Indiana
Moves to Grant Broad New Legal Rights to Dead Celebrities, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER
(Feb. 9, 2012, 12:09 AM), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/thr-esq/indiana-dead-
celebrities-legal-rights-james-dean-law-288124; Dennis Hevesi, Afterlife of the Famous:
Heirs Warn of 'Poachers,' N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 1988)
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/26/nyregion/afterlife-of-the-famous-heirs-warn-of-
poachers.html.
13. Gary Scott, Protecting the Future of Marilyn's Past, L.A. DAILY J., Oct. 8, 2007,
at 1,4.
14. Greg Johnson, Protecting Dead Icons Back for an Encore, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 8,
1999), http://articles.latimes.com/1999/apr/08/business/fi-25343.
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photographs of celebrities. A new property right that vests in the
celebrity herself (or the celebrity's heirs) reduces the value of the
photographer's copyrights. A celebrity photographer may then be forced
to purchase permissions from her subjects before selling her photos.
Consequently, photographers have uniformly opposed legislation
expanding publicity rights.
Other groups potentially opposed to celebrity rights are the
publishing and advertising industries. Newspapers tried to stop publicity
rights laws from being enacted. The New York Times, for example,
challenged various attempts to enact a postmortem right in the state of
New York. Similarly, the Committee on Communications and Media
Law of the Association of the Bar for the City of New York opposed
posthumous rights legislation because "[i]t would severely restrict the
ability of New York media entities ... to portray deceased private and
public figures in their work." 15 In the state of Washington, publishers
fought to amend a proposed statute so as to require some sort of culpable
mental state before a newspaper could be held liable for invoking a
celebrity. It is easy to see why newspapers would be nervous about
enhanced publicity rights, which could potentially subject their reporting
to a veto from celebrity interests concerned with unflattering journalistic
portraits. While attempts to apply the right of publicity against the press
present obvious free expression concerns, publishers could also find
themselves forced to rely on ambiguous and potentially costly First
Amendment defenses if facing lawsuits under the new legislation. 16
It appears that for most states that have considered right of
publicity legislation, the support of celebrities, licensing companies, and,
as discussed next, movie and television studios trumped opposition from
photographers, newspapers, and others. Since the 1980s, when
legislatures have considered the right of publicity, they have generally
acted to expand the right, thus enlarging celebrity economic power.
15. ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., COMM. ON COMMC'NS & MEDIA LAW,
REPORT ON LEGISLATION, A8836/S6005, at 1 (2007),
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/Dead-Celebrities.pdf.
16. Although publishers were largely unsuccessful at stopping the wave of new right
of publicity protections in the 1980s and 1990s, they were able to convince both courts
and legislatures to adopt exceptions for "newsworthy" uses of celebrities. Several right
of publicity laws contain explicit exceptions for uses of celebrity in strictly journalistic
activities. E.g., IND. CODE § 32-36-1-1(b)-(c) (2016).
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C. STUDIOS
The entertainment media, particularly movie and television
studios, represent another key player in publicity rights legislation. Their
perspective on celebrity rights is more complicated than that of the
photographers and newspapers. On the one hand, entertainment interests
may view an expanding right of publicity negatively. Expanding
publicity rights could threaten efforts to generate new content. At the
least, increased protections for celebrities could force media interests
into significant payouts to celebrities and their heirs. For example, a
studio producing a film depicting the life of a famous, deceased athlete
may have to gain clearance from the athlete's estate before going
forward with its film. Because of these fears, in California, the Motion
Picture Association of America (MPAA)-as well as television
networks CBS and NBC -opposed the initial recognition of postmortem
rights in 1985.17 ABC, CBS, and NBC made similar arguments opposing
proposed legislation to create a postmortem right in New York.
On the other hand, these content providers also have a
countervailing interest in strong publicity rights. Modern media
companies now leverage celebrity in a variety of formats, not just a
single medium like television or film. Strong publicity rights help
provide consistent control over celebrity images, thereby making this
important component of modern media more stable and reliable. By
limiting the number of ways to legally use the celebrity's persona,
publicity rights inoculate that persona from the potentially dilutive
effects of multiple speakers sending inconsistent messages about that
celebrity. Movie and television studios provide the stages for the
population to experience celebrity. These businesses want to preserve
their own ability to use celebrity to attract viewers while at the same time
making sure that these celebrities are not subject to radical
reappropriations by others. A strong right of publicity vested in the
individual celebrity at least helps promote a consistent- and hopefully
not oversaturated- image for their stars.
The support of these media companies became a critical factor in
determining whether or not proposed celebrity rights legislation
succeeded. Although motion picture studios originally opposed
postmortem rights in California, they were able to secure significant
17. Heller, supra note 12, at 549 50.
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changes in the proposed legislation that favored their own interests and
tempered their opposition. Hence, the 1985 legislation was altered to
exclude use of a celebrity persona in "a play, book, magazine,
newspaper, musical composition, film, radio or television program, other
than an advertisement." '1 8 Texas's postmortem publicity right was
drafted in consultation with the motion picture industry and, during the
floor debate over the legislation, its sponsor urged its passage without
any amendments lest the industry withdraw its support. One
assemblyman objected to the legislation and to the movie studios'
intimate role in its drafting, stating: "I'm sure the motion picture industry
signed off on it because they were specifically exempted so it doesn't
apply to them." 19 Indeed, during discussions over the Texas bill,
revisions were made to ensure that use of deceased celebrity names,
likenesses, and voices could be made in films and television programs
without violating the new law.
20
More recent alterations to the California right of publicity have also
won the studios' approval. In 1999, the California legislature decided to
grant celebrity heirs an additional twenty years of protection, extending
control of postmortem publicity rights from fifty years beyond the date
of death to seventy years beyond the date of death and eliminating
several prior specific statutory exemptions. The television networks and
motion picture studios agreed to the expansion.2 1 A proposed provision
within that legislation that would have prohibited the manipulation of
deceased personas through digital technology in expressive works was
dropped at the behest of the MPAA. 22 Similarly, the studios managed to
kill another provision that would have outlawed defamatory references
to deceased celebrities in films and television shows. As one of the chief
lobbyists for the MPAA explained after the passage of California's 1999
law, "new language" was added during the drafting process that
"resolved our objections." 23 More recently, the California legislature
18. CAL. CIv. CODE § 990(n) (West 1988).
19. Audio tape: Floor Debate, Texas H.R. (Apr. 9, 1987) (on file with author).
20. Id.
21. See Heller, supra note 12, at 554 55; Thomas F. Zuber, Everlasting Fame:
Recent Legislation Has Clarified the Descendible Right of Publicity for Personalities
Who Died Prior to 1985, L.A. LAW., May 2009, at 30 31.
22. Joseph J. Beard, Fresh Flowers for Forest Lawn: Amendment of the California
Post-Mortem Right of Publicity Statute, ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Winter 2000, at 1, 25.
23. Id.
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responded to a district court opinion holding that the estate of Marilyn
Monroe had no publicity rights because a statutory descendible publicity
right did not exist when she died in 1962.24 Just a few weeks after the
opinion issued, the legislature expanded celebrity postmortem rights by
providing that such rights cover not just those celebrities who died when
the original postmortem right was enacted in 1985, but also celebrities
that died before 1985. The studios made no opposition to this
legislation. 25
In contrast, when the studios are not brought into the legislative
process, proposed right of publicity laws die in committee. For example,
in 2007, the New York legislature began its consideration of a
postmortem publicity right. One reason that the proposed legislation
failed might have been the exclusion of media companies. In letters of
opposition to the proposed legislation, several studios expressed their
displeasure at not being included in the drafting process.26 Given the
political economy of celebrity rights, such proposals are much less likely
to secure the necessary legislative support when studio concerns are
24. Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 2d 1152,
1156 (C.D. Cal. 2008).
25. Post-mortem Publicity Rights of Deceased Celebrities: Hearing on S.B. 771
Before the S. Rules Comm., 2007 08 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2007) (listing those in support and
opposition to the legislation).
26. See, e.g., Letter from Stacey M. Byrnes, Senior Vice President, Intellectual Prop.
Counsel, NBC Universal, to the Hon. Helene Weinstein, N.Y. State Assemb. (June 20,
2007) (explaining that NBC was crafting its own bill that it had not yet had the
opportunity to put before the legislature); Letter from Martin D. Franks, Exec. Vice
President, CBS Corp., to the Hon. Helene E. Weinstein, N.Y. State Assemb. (June 19,
2007) ("CBS Corporation will be profoundly affected by this Bill, which was introduced
just two weeks ago on May 31, 2007, leaving CBS Corporation no opportunity to
consider it thoroughly and present to the legislature our views on its impact on the work
we do."); Letter from Henry S. Hoberman, Senior Vice President, Counsel, ABC, Inc.,
to the Hon. Helene E. Weinstein, N.Y. State Assemb. (June 19, 2007) ("We urge you to
delay further action on the Bill in order to afford interested parties, including Disney,
ESPN and ABC, the opportunity to present our views and discuss them with you and
other legislators in a meaningful way."). In 2017, New York State legislators proposed
a new right of publicity bill providing postmortem protections. Again, opposition from
the motion picture industry (and other groups) caused the bill to be pulled before it could
come up for a vote. See Jennifer E. Rothman, New York Legislature Feels the Heat and
Pulls Right of Publicity Bill, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY ROADMAP, June 21, 2017,
http://www.rightofpublicityroadmap.com/news-commentary/new-york-legislature-
feels-heat-and-pulls-right-publicity-bill.
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ignored.27
Along with film studios, the video game industry represents
another sector disadvantaged by the expansion of the right of publicity.
Although not a powerful lobbying interest in the 1980s and 1990s, the
video game industry now represents an important actor in the
conversation over celebrity rights. Several recent publicity rights cases
have come out in the industry's favor. 28 One notable case involving
Lindsay Lohan held that Grand Theft Auto V-which featured inexact
imitations of Lohan and TV personality Karen Gravano did not violate
either celebrity's right of publicity.
2 9
More to the point of this Part, the video game industry's opposition
to the right of publicity likely has exerted pressure on legislators to reject
recently proposed statutory expansions. During the past decade, both the
New Hampshire and Massachusetts legislatures have failed to approve
bills that would have created postmortem publicity rights for
celebrities. 30 J.D. Salinger's son, Matt Salinger, was a notable proponent
of the New Hampshire bill, which passed through the House and Senate
but was vetoed by the state governor in 2012.31 Notably, the video game
industry opposed the bill because it failed to include video games in its
list of works entitled to a specific statutory exemption. 32 A similar
posthumous publicity rights bill in Massachusetts, supported by Bill
27. Leon Neyfakh, Who Owns You After You Die?, BOSTON GLOBE (Aug. 19, 2012),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2012/08/18/who-owns-you-after-you-
die/Ssv75hSRzbWGDcbNdSwh0K/story.html.
28. See, e.g., Davis v. Elec. Arts Inc., 775 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir. 2015); Hart v. Elec.
Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013); C.B.C. Dist. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League
Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818, 823 24 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that an
online fantasy major league baseball game did not violate the players' right of publicity).
29. Gravano v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 37 N.Y.S.3d 20, 21 22 (App.
Div. 2016).
30. Cf. EDWARD H. ROSENTHAL, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 9 (2014),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/20 15_i
ntellectual-property lit/materials/the right of publicity-article rosenthal.authcheckda
m.pdf.
31. Jonathan Faber, Observations Regarding New Hampshire's Right of Publicity
Effort and Governor Lynch's Veto of SB 175, RIGHT OF PUBLICITY (June 22, 2012),
http://rightofpublicity.com/observations-regarding-new-hampshires-right-of-publicity-
effort-and-governor-lynchs-veto-of-sb-175.
32. Tamlin H. Bason & Mahira Khan, New Hampshire's Publicity Statute Battle
Showcases Rival Views of Evolving Doctrine, 84 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA) 488 (2012).
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Cosby, failed on three separate occasions to make it through the
legislature, the last time being in 2014. 33
D. INDIVIDUAL CONSUMERS
A final group with an interest in this debate is the consuming
public. Celebrities serve as powerful cultural symbols that individuals
can deploy to communicate something about themselves. When
someone invokes the persona of John Wayne or Lady Gaga, they are
saying something not just about the celebrity but also about themselves.
Publicity rights threaten this process of identity formation and personal
expression by giving the celebrity or her estate the power to determine
which invocations of the celebrity persona are appropriate and which are
not.
This Article focuses on a time period in which the critical
understanding of how individuals use celebrity changed. Old
understandings of celebrity culture described the interface between
celebrities and their audiences as a one-way street with audiences
accepting celebrity communications at face value. In the 1980s and
1990s, however, new academic disciplines emerged to emphasize the
unexpected ways audiences interacted with celebrity symbols, and prior
scholars of celebrity were criticized for portraying audiences as
unrealistically passive. New critics of celebrity culture contended that
the consumptive practices of those receiving cultural material deserved
greater recognition. According to this new view of celebrity audiences,
there was a dynamic exchange occurring between celebrities and their
fans, with the latter constantly reworking the messages articulated by the
former. 34
This new view of the celebrity-audience dynamic did not favor the
expansion of celebrity rights. The more that consumers of celebrity were
seen as engaging in their own creative activity, the less justifiable
restrictions on that creative process became. As a consequence, laws that
prevented derivative use of celebrity messages threatened to take away
33. ROSENTHAL, supra note 30, at 9; Shira Schoenberg, Bill Supported by Comedian
Bill Cosby Would Protect Massachusetts Celebrities' Rights to Their Image After Death,
MAssLIVE (July 3, 2014, 11:52 AM),
http://www.masslive.com/politics/index.ssf/2014/07/bill-supported-by-comedian-bil.
html.
34. See, e.g., JOHN FISKE, UNDERSTANDING POPULAR CULTURE (1989).
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valuable raw material for the construction of social identity.
The voices of individual consumers (and the academics who
studied them) were not heard in the legislative process, however. As the
various interest groups battled over extending celebrity protections, they
paid little attention to the concerns of the consumers of celebrity
themselves. The reason probably lies in a basic collective action
problem. It is difficult for citizens concerned about personal expression
to coalesce in ways that would make their presence felt by state
legislators. The stakes are likely too small or too hidden for individual
citizens to feel that they need to take action upon becoming aware of
celebrity rights legislation. Some organizations could potentially
articulate the interests of individual consumers. For example, the
American Civil Liberties Union opposed, on personal expression
grounds, California's initial decision to grant postmortem celebrity
rights.35 In 2017, the New York Civil Liberties Union protested
proposed legislation broadly expanding New York's right of publicity
law. 36 In general, however, the difficulties of mobilizing consumers to
respond to increased publicity rights have proved insurmountable.
Instead, the lobbying efforts of those favoring expanding publicity rights
triumphed.
III. MAKING CELEBRITY POLITICALLY PALATABLE
Special protections for celebrities suddenly became a safer political
bet in the last years of the twentieth century. Part of the answer, on the
legislative side, can be found in studying how celebrities, their heirs, and
their licensing agencies were able to co-opt key rivals and convince
legislators to enact broader and longer-lasting publicity rights. Another
part of the answer lies in the cultural forces influencing judges in the
relevant period.
At the same time that celebrity interest groups were scoring
legislative victories, courts were announcing more generous
interpretations of the right of publicity, widening its scope and
recognizing postmortem rights. A partial explanation for this judicial
about-face can be found in the changing definition of fame. Originally,
35. Stephen F. Rohde, Dracula: Still Undead, CAL. LAW., Apr. 1985, at 51, 53.
36. Victoria Tang, NCAC, NYCLU Oppose Expansion of "Right to Publicity" Laws,
NAT'L COALITION AGAINST CENSORSHIP (June 26, 2017), http://ncac.org/blog/ncac-
nyclu-oppose-expansion-of-right-to-publicity-laws.
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celebrity status was something that only applied to a rarified few. In the
1980s and 1990s, however, the perceived relationship between the
famous and their audiences changed in ways that appeared more
inclusive and, hence, made special judicial protections for celebrities
more politically palatable.
A. THE CHANGING DEFINITION OF FAME
Lawmakers establishing the right of publicity in the 1950s and
1960s acted in the context of a particular view of what it meant to be
famous. This view led to several restrictions on the right. Instead of
being something that anyone could potentially enjoy, fame was reserved
for a select group that had demonstrated great achievement. As a result,
the privileges afforded by the right of publicity were fundamentally
undemocratic. Not everyone could be great, not everyone had equal
access to the spotlight, and this caused reluctance in awarding special
legal protections to celebrities.
Until the last part of the twentieth century, fame remained tied to
some form of greatness in the popular imagination. Discourses of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries spoke of rises to fame based on
merit. Fame went to those whose accomplishments placed them ahead
of the rest. In narratives describing early Hollywood celebrities, their
stardom required a "virtue, genius, character, or skill that did not depend
on audience recognition." 3 7 In other words, the greatness linked to fame
relied on special qualities inherent to the celebrity herself. The link
between fame and inner greatness made celebrity an elite phenomenon.
"Inner greatness was a precondition for celebrity, and.., greatness only
resided in a select few." 38
Evidence of this aristocratic view of fame can be seen in the
publicity narratives of the first half of the twentieth century. Film stars
from this era were described as "royalty." Even as Hollywood began to
present more inclusive descriptions of celebrity in the 1950s and 1960s,
there was still a sense that the talent necessary for celebrity was innate.
One could not plan to become famous. Instead, "[f]ame, based on an
indefinable internal quality of the self, was natural, almost
37. GAMSON, supra note 4, at 28.
38. Mark Bartholomew, A Right is Born: Celebrity, Property, and Postmodern
Lawmaking, 44 CONN. L. REV. 301, 347 (2011).
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predestined. '39 Celebrity was still reserved for a chosen few, those with
the inner greatness that justified stardom.
By the 1980s, however, the understanding that fame was dependent
on achievement had changed. As media outlets proliferated, particularly
with the introduction of cable television, more and more celebrities were
needed. Although narratives discussing a celebrity's destiny or inner
talents still existed, in large part, greatness became decoupled from
celebrity. Cultural observers began to notice that talent and fame were
no longer linked. Examples of famous artists and athletes who had
actually achieved little in their particular fields began to multiply.
Madonna, the quintessential 1980s celebrity, became known for self-
promotion, not her talents as a singer or actor. Fame was no longer yoked
to narratives of inner greatness and outside accomplishment. As a result,
there was a new sense that anyone, not just those with special talents,
could become a celebrity.
The Internet has only exacerbated this trend. Modern
representations of celebrities, whether on television, in print, or online,
depict familiarity rather than unapproachability. By portraying
celebrities as regular people, social media has made fame more
egalitarian. Surveys reveal a surge in the number of people who think
they will someday be famous. Not everyone can be great, but everyone
can be a celebrity. 40
In today's society, businesses continue to become more and more
enamored with public figures that lack any apparent qualification for
their fame. Modern marketing texts stress the value of "manufactured
celebrities" over stars with great talent, because the former lack the
bargaining power of the latter and thus can be exploited to the full
potential of media companies and advertisers. 4 1 As a result, advertisers
39. GAMSON, supra note 4, at 32.
40. GRAEME TURNER, ORDINARY PEOPLE AND THE MEDIA: THE DEMOTIC TURN 14
(2010) ("[T]hese trends have resulted in the idea of celebrity itself mutating: no longer a
magical condition, research suggests that it is fast becoming an almost reasonable
expectation for us to have of our everyday lives."). Andy Warhol famously articulated
this decoupling of fame and achievement in 1968 by claiming that "[i]n the future,
everyone will be world-famous for fifteen minutes." David Abbitt, Fifteen Minutes of
Fame and the First and Fourteenth Amendments, HUFINGTON POST (Oct. 22, 2013),
http://wwwhuffingtonpost.com/david-abbitt/fifteen-minutes-of-fame-a b 3789290bJtml.
41. Egon Franck & Stephan Nfiesch, Avoiding "Star Wars" - Celebrity Creation as
Media Strategy, 60 KYKLOS 211, 226-27 (2007).
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create their own celebrities, such as the Old Spice Guy or Jared from
Subway, that offer no underlying talent or record of accomplishment to
justify their notoriety. Businesses quickly sign "accidental" celebrities
like O.J. Simpson's houseguest Kato Kaelin and Jeremy Meeks, whose
handsome mugshot became a viral sensation after being posted on the
Facebook page of the Stockton, California police department. In some
ways, these famous faces offer the perfect canvas for marketers looking
to tell their own stories about their brands while attracting consumer
attention. Paris Hilton has been described as the quintessential
postmodern celebrity because there was no awareness or expectation of
talent to get in the way of her image. Her fame spoke entirely for itself,
and that fame translated into great commercial success. 42
B. JUDGING AND THE NEW DEMOCRATIC VIEW OF CELEBRITY
The new democratic notion of fame found purchase in courts,
possibly providing one explanation for the expansion of celebrity rights
in the 1980s and 1990s. Judges took steps to articulate a new vision of
the right of publicity that could apply to everyone.
Prior cases and commentaries suggested that the availability of the
right of publicity was limited to a small group of people that had become
famous and managed to trade on that fame. Hence, the Georgia Supreme
Court explained, "[W]hile private citizens have the right of privacy,
public figures have a similar right of publicity."4 3 Legal scholars of the
time contended that non-celebrities could only turn to the right of
privacy, which did not provide any compensation for the economic value
of the defendant's unauthorized use, because they had no right of
publicity cause of action.
44
42. Alan Behr & Andria Beeler-Norrholm, Fame, Fortune, and the Occasional
Branding Misstep: When Good Celebrities Go Bad, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Nov.
2006, at 6, 9. In one case involving Ms. Hilton, the court noted that the producers of a
feature film paid her $1 million, not for her acting abilities, but because they hoped to
capitalize on the 'Paris Hilton' brand." Goldberg v. Paris Hilton Ent., Inc., No. 08-
22261-CIV, 2009 WL 2525482, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 17, 2009).
43. Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc.,
296 S.E.2d 697, 703 (Ga. 1982).
44. Howard I. Berkman, The Right of Publicity-Protection for Public Figures and
Celebrities, 42 BROOK. L. REv. 527, 532 33 (1976); Richard B. Hoffman, The Right of
Publicity -Heirs' Right, Advertisers' Windfall, or Courts' Nightmare?, 31 DEPAUL L.
REv. 1,7 (1981).
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The anti-democratic implications of celebrity rights sometimes
bubbled to the surface of legal opinions. In a case involving postmortem
rights in the persona of Elvis Presley, the Sixth Circuit offered several
reasons for refusing to recognize postmortem publicity rights. Most
troubling for the court was the thought of a celebrity's economic power
descending from generation to generation. "[T]he law has always
thought that leaving a good name to one's children is sufficient reward
in itself for the individual," the court explained.4 5 Placing the fame's
economic rewards "in the hands of heirs is contrary to our legal tradition
and somehow seems contrary to the moral presuppositions of our
culture." 4 6 Likewise, in 1979, the California Supreme Court fretted that
posthumous publicity rights would create a world where a celebrity's
heirs "are the only ones who should have the opportunity to exploit their
ancestor's personality."
47
In contrast, the modern interpretation of the right of publicity
stresses the right's egalitarian nature. In the last years of the twentieth
century, judges repeatedly took pains to note the universal eligibility for
the right of publicity. Even though most right of publicity cases involve
celebrity plaintiffs, modern courts emphasize that the right, in principle,
can apply to anyone. Hence, the California Court of Appeal stressed that
California's right of publicity statute needed to be construed to include
both celebrity and non-celebrity plaintiffs.48 One judge explained, "I am
convinced that the right of publicity resides in every person, not just
famous and infamous individuals."'49 The Eleventh Circuit altered the
Supreme Court of Georgia's earlier definition of the right of publicity by
replacing a 1982 decision that defined it as "a celebrity's right" with a
new definition describing it as an "individual's right. ' 50 Rather than
45. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir. 1980).
46. Id.
47. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425,430 (Cal. 1979).
48. KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 2000).
49. Fanelle v. Lojack Corp., No. CIV.A. 99-4292, 2000 WL 1801270, at *11 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 7, 2000).
50. Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., Inc.,
296 S.E.2d 697, 700 (Ga. 1982); Toffoloni v. LFP Publishing Group, LLC, 572 F.3d
1201, 1205 (1 1th Cir. 2009); see also Cheatham v. Paisano Pubs., Inc., 891 F. Supp. 381,
386 (W.D. Ky. 1995) (in a case of first impression evaluating a claim under Kentucky's
common law right of publicity, the court noted that "celebrity status" is not a prerequisite
for such a claim); Onassis v. Christian Dior-N.Y., Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 260 (Sup. Ct.
1984) ("[A]ll persons, of whatever station in life, from the relatively unknown to the
WHITTIER LAW REVIEW
requiring proof of commercial value in the plaintiff's identity, courts
have come to presume such value from the defendant's unauthorized use,
a doctrinal change friendly to less-than-famous litigants.
5 1
These changes emphasizing a new, broader view of celebrity
coincided with a blurring of the distinction between celebrities and legal
actors. Recognizing that the requirements for celebrity have loosened
and that demographic targeting now allows for stardom beyond the fields
of sports and entertainment, lawyers have set out to find their own fame.
Online legal "halls of fame" and law-themed gossip blogs confer their
own celebrity status on different legal actors, including lawyers and
judges. Cable news often centers on legal disputes, turning the spotlight
on parties and their attorneys. At the same time, judges increasingly
pepper their decisions with references from celebrity-infused popular
culture .52
All of this translates into a newfound acceptance of celebrity
protections. Rather than representing a valuable legal perk for an
incredibly select few, the right of publicity became a property right that
anyone can aspire to. As a result, judges increasingly described the right
at the end of the twentieth century through strong property rights
rhetoric.
Before the 1980s, judges seemed to view the right of publicity as
an inferior sort of property, if it was even property at all. This was
evident in the reluctance to recognize posthumous publicity rights. The
right to bequeath one's property at death has been described by the
United States Supreme Court as "one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of [property] rights." 53 By making the right of testamentary
disposition inapplicable to publicity rights, courts made sure that the
publicity right had an inferior status. As one court explained, the right of
publicity was a type of property legally inferior to personal property.
Instead, the right was more like "titles," "offices," "trust," and
"friendship," "attribute[s] from which others may benefit but may not
world famous, are to be secured against rapacious commercial exploitation.").
51. 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § § 3:2,4:7 (2d
ed. 2016).
52. Douglas E. Abrams, References to Television Programming in Judicial Opinions
and Lawyers' Advocacy, 99 MARQ. L. REV. 993, 994 (2016); Nathan Koppel, Court
Jesting: These Sentences Don't Get Judged Too Harshly, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2011),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 10001424052702304453304576391700217502560.
53. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704,716 (1987).
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own." 54 In this period, judges often described the right of publicity and
the personal right of privacy in the same breath. Privacy rights were not
recognized as property. Rather, they were dignitary rights that resided
with the individual and could not be exchanged with others. Just as the
right to privacy was not meant to last after death and was not really
"property," neither was the right of publicity.
Courts moved past this way of thinking as the idea of celebrity
shifted at the end of the twentieth century. They switched to describing
the right of publicity as a robust property right. As one state court
explained in its decision to recognize postmortem publicity rights,
despite a prior decision of the Sixth Circuit to the contrary, the right of
publicity had to be construed as "a species of intangible personal
property" that, a fortiori, included the "unrestricted right of
disposition." 55 Along similar lines, courts began to recognize "celebrity
goodwill" as marital property that was subject to equitable distribution
upon divorce. 56 No longer were the "personal" right of privacy and the
right of publicity lumped together. Instead, as the Tenth Circuit
explained, there was a clear "distinction between the personal right to be
left alone and the business right to control the use of one's identity in
commerce." 57 The new view of fame made the right of publicity appear
more democratic and, therefore, a subject that could be described
through property rights rhetoric.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article represents a partial attempt to trace out the history of
one particular intellectual property right. That history shows that it took
decades for the right of publicity to become the valuable economic
property interest that it is today. The right first appeared in 1953, but it
only became descendible, broad enough in scope to cover all aspects of
persona, and defined as a property right at the end of the twentieth
54. Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956, 959 (6th Cir. 1980).
55. Tennessee ex rel. Elvis Presley Int'l Mem'l Found. v. Crowell, 733 S.W.2d 89,
96 97 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
56. Piscopo v. Piscopo, 555 A.2d 1190, 1193 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988); Elkus
v. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901, 901, 903 04 (App. Div. 1991); Golub v. Golub, 527
N.Y.S.2d 946, 950 (Sup. Ct. 1988); Allen M. Parkman, Human Capital as Property in
Celebrity Divorces, 29 FAM. L.Q. 141, 141-42 (1995).
57. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959,967 (10th
Cir. 1996).
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century. Although the commercial importance of celebrity increased
during this period, that is not the whole story. Also important to this
narrative, a particular political coalition formed that was able to push
through broad new celebrity rights protections. At the same time, it was
only when judicial perceptions of celebrity became democratized in the
1980s and 1990s that judges permitted doctrinal innovations greatly
strengthening the rights of celebrities.
The story of the right of publicity is the story of only a single kind
of intellectual property, one that is invoked much less frequently than
other more traditional forms of intellectual property. But the history
described above suggests that political and cultural forces, rather than
legal logic or a simple desire to safeguard economic value, have a large
impact on how intellectual property rights are constituted. If so, it would
be advantageous for the legal community to be aware of this
phenomenon. The right of publicity has become more relevant in an era
where social media promises the ability to broadcast one's identity to
millions, and popular narratives show Instagram, YouTube, and
Snapchat catapulting everyday citizens to stardom. Courts seem to be
responding, enlarging the definition of celebrity to include anyone with
even a tiny online following. 58 Often, intellectual property law is
criticized for not adequately adapting to current conditions. It seems,
however, that in certain situations it is very much a product of its times.
58. See Perkins v. Linkedln Corp., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1211 (N.D. Cal. 2014);
Fraley v. Facebook, 830 F. Supp. 2d 785, 804 05 (N.D. Cal. 2011).
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